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A long tradition in economic thought asserts that prices minimize the amount of communication required in arriving at an efficient allocation of resources. 
Friedrich A. Hayek (1945) emphasized this point as one of the keys to the suc-
cess of market capitalism, and Leonid Hurwicz (1977) formalized it, utilizing the 
additional assumption that firms’ production sets, and consumers’ preferred sets, 
are convex. Recent theoretical results of Noam Nisan and Ilya Segal (2006) make 
it clear that such additional assumptions are important. In some striking examples, 
Liad Blumrosen and Nisan (2005) show that price-guided procedures can fail to 
achieve even a fraction of the maximum possible value. Worst-case theoretical anal-
yses, however, leave open the possibility that auctions guided by individual item 
prices might perform well in a far wider range of environments than those studied in 
neoclassical economic theory.
Over the past few years, economic experimenters have explored that possibility. 
They have designed price-guided auction mechanisms—cousins of the Walrasian 
tâtonnement process—and tested them on selected allocation problems. These new 
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Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: 
A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis†
By John H. Kagel, Yuanchuan Lien, and Paul Milgrom*
We use theory and experiment to explore the performance of multi-
round, price-guided, combinatorial auctions. We define efficiency-
relevant and core-relevant packages and show that if bidders bid 
aggressively on these and losing bidders bid to their limits, then the 
auction leads to efficient or core allocations. We study the theoreti-
cally relevant behaviors and hypothesize that subjects will make only 
a few significant bids, and that certain simulations with auto-bidders 
will predict variations in performance across different environments. 
Testing the combinatorial clock auction (CCA) design, we find 
experimental support for these two hypotheses. We also compare the 
CCA to a simultaneous ascending auction. (JEL D44)
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mechanisms differ from the classical Walrasian mechanism in two important ways. 
First, for any specified prices, the quantities bid at each round represent an actual 
commitment to buy the demanded bundle at the specified prices. And second, these 
mechanisms use both current and past bids in a single optimization to determine the 
winning bids, so that formerly losing bids can become winning.1
Two recent papers report pioneering experiments with such mechanisms. The 
RAD mechanism of Anthony M. Kwasnica et al. (2005) uses the bids at each round 
to compute tentative prices for each item that come “as close as possible” to mar-
ket clearing prices in a particular metric. After each round, the prices are reported 
back to the bidders and used to set minimum bids for the next round of bidding. 
Individual item prices in RAD can increase or decrease from round to round. In 
contrast, the combinatorial clock auction (CCA) mechanism, introduced and tested 
by David Porter et al. (2003), determines prices for each item that increase mono-
tonically from round to round.
Porter et al. (2003) report surprisingly efficient outcomes from an experiment 
testing the CCA. In 25 auction trials, efficiencies of 99 percent are reported in two 
trials and 100 percent are reported in the remaining 23 trials. Unfortunately, these 
results cannot be replicated because detailed information about the valuations used 
in their experiment is unavailable.
Do these experimental findings disprove the significance of the theoretical ones? 
Can experiments provide a way to assess “average” as opposed to “worst case” 
performance? Do they enable appropriate comparisons among mechanisms? The 
answers, we argue, are negative; only a combination of experiments and theory 
can be sufficient. To illustrate why, consider the experiment reported by Christoph 
Brunner et al. (2010), and Goeree, Holt, and Ledyard (2007), testing a RAD-
inspired design-to-sell radio spectrum licenses for FCC auction 73. The experiment 
entailed selling 18 licenses: 12 “national” licenses and 6 “regional” licenses. The 
number of possible packages is the number of nonempty subsets of a set of 18 items, 
or 262,143. So, setting aside any possible value interdependencies or externalities, 
the set of possible value profiles for n bidders is  ℜ  + 262143n , which is far too large to 
explore systematically using experimental trials alone.
In this paper, we study combinatorial auctions using a mix of theory and experi-
ments. Our theory consists of two parts. The first asks the question, ‘under what 
conditions does a series of bids in a combinatorial auction produce allocations that 
are efficient or in the core?’2 To answer that, we introduce the concepts of effi-
ciency-relevant and core-relevant packages and of sufficiently aggressive bidding. 
We show that for a very broad set of auction mechanisms, if bids in the auction for 
the efficiency-relevant or core-relevant packages are sufficiently aggressive, then the 
auction outcome will be an efficient or core allocation, respectively. As the relevant 
1 To illustrate this important feature, suppose that three bidders are bidding for two items, A and B, and that 
each bidder places only one bid. Bidder 1 offers 5 for item A, bidder 2 offers 5 for item B, and bidder 3 offers 11 for 
the bundle AB, respectively. Then, the highest total price 11 is then obtained from bidder 3’s bid alone. If bidder 2 
subsequently raises its bid for B to 7, then the highest total price rises to 12, which is obtained by combining bidder 
2’s new bid with bidder 1’s formerly losing bid. 
2 The allocation of an auction is in the core if, in addition to being efficient, it is individually rational and the 
total price paid by each bidder and group of bidders is “competitive,” meaning that it is not less than the opportunity 
cost of the resources the bidder or group acquires.
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packages are only a subset of all possible packages, this conclusion suggests that the 
most important difference in performance among combinatorial mechanisms may 
lie in their ability to elicit relevant bids.
The problem of eliciting sufficiently aggressive bids for relevant packages is 
made complicated by the sheer number of profitable packages in some auctions, 
which we hypothesize makes it likely that some packages never receive any bids. 
We conjecture that the bids based on price feedback are the only important ones 
in determining the systematic performance of auction mechanisms like RAD and 
CCA. This leads us to the second part of our theory—the empirical hypothesis that 
the performance of simulations with particular automated bidders can predict the 
performance of auction experiments with human subjects. The automated bidders 
bid myopically in each round for the currently most profitable package. Our experi-
ment tests this hypothesis using the CCA mechanism and a closely matched version 
of the simultaneous ascending auction (SAA), which is a nonpackage auction that 
is widely used for radio spectrum sales. We use simulations to select parameters for 
our experiment, including some parameters predicted to lead to efficient auction 
outcomes (“easy” cases) and others predicted to lead to inefficient outcomes (“hard” 
cases).3
Our main experimental findings are mostly consistent with our hypotheses. 
Subjects consistently bid on only a small number of packages in the CCA auctions.
Some profitable packages never receive any bids. A large majority of bids are placed 
on the myopically most profitable packages, but we find that other cues can also 
influence the packages that subjects choose to bid on. Efficiency is significantly 
higher in easy than in hard cases for the CCA auctions, and the reasons line up well 
with the first part of our theory that the most profitable packages correspond to the 
relevant packages in the easy auctions, but not in the hard auctions. The easy CCA 
auctions have significantly higher efficiency than the corresponding SAA auctions, 
but there are no significant differences in efficiency between the two auction formats 
for those auctions classified as hard. Guided by our theory, we look closely at the 
auctions classified as hard and identify and characterize a subset of those auctions 
for which the CCA mechanism generates significantly lower efficiency than in the 
corresponding SAA auctions.
We also divide our test cases into “core-easy” and “core-hard cases,” according to 
how close the simulated outcomes are to core outcomes. In contrast to the efficiency 
tests, the distance from the core in simulations is only weakly predictive of the same 
measure in the experiment. The reasons for this remain to be explored.
For the remainder of this paper: Section I presents our theoretical results, identify-
ing sufficient conditions for obtaining efficient or core allocations in the large class 
of standard package auctions. Section II describes the experimental procedures. 
Section III presents the experimental results and tests our hypotheses. Concluding 
remarks are offered in Section IV.
3 We do not report any distribution of selected parameters to subjects, as might be useful if we were testing Bayesian 
equilibrium theories based on commonly known prior beliefs. Our experiment is not designed to test such theories.
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I. Theory and Hypotheses
To facilitate comparisons of dynamic auctions with direct mechanisms, it is help-
ful to think of, and sometimes to refer to, the highest bid a bidder makes on a pack-
age during the course of a dynamic auction as the bidder’s “reported value” for that 
package. If a bidder never bids for a package, it is as if the reported value is zero.
Our general theory studies two nested classes of auctions. The wider class con-
sists of total-bid-maximizing mechanisms, which assign the goods to bidders to 
maximize the total reported value, that is, the total of the winning bids. An auction is 
standard if, in addition, it fixes bidder payments so that the allocation is in the core 
with respect to the reported values. Standard auctions include the menu auctions of 
B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1986), dynamic auctions includ-
ing CCA and RAD, the ascending proxy auctions of Lawrence M. Ausubel and 
Milgrom (2002), the one-shot core-selecting auctions of Robert Day and Milgrom 
(2007) (recently adopted for use in Portuguese spectrum sales), and some auction 
mechanisms recently used in Ireland and the United Kingdom.4 Vickrey auctions, 
however, are not standard, because their outcomes can fail to be core allocations.
Our theory of standard package auctions emphasizes the role of bids placed on 
relevant packages, and the description of these requires introducing some notation.
Let N denote the set of bidders; g the set of goods on offer; xj the package of 
goods assigned to bidder j; vj (xj ) bidder j’s value for its goods; x = (xj )j∊N the goods 
assignment; and X the set of feasible assignments. The seller is player 0. An alloca-
tion (x, τ) consists of a goods assignment x and a vector τ ∊ ℜ N+1 describing the 
payments by the bidders and the seller’s receipts. The allocation (x, τ) is feasible if x 
∊ X and τ0 ≤  ∑ j∊N     τ j. The total value of the goods assignment x is  ∑ j∊N      v j (xj ). The 
triple (N, X, (vj )j∊N ) defines a package allocation problem.
Associated with any package allocation problem is a cooperative game with 
transferable utility (N ∪ {0}, w). The players in this game are the bidders N and the 
seller, denoted as player 0. To define the coalitional value function, it is convenient 
to introduce notation associating to each coalition some value-maximizing assign-
ment x(S) ∊ arg maxx∊X  ∑ j∊S     v j (xj ). The value of the coalition consisting of the seller 
and the bidders in set S is w (S) =  ∑ j∊S      v j (xj (S)). Any coalition that excludes the 
seller has value zero.
For any package xj, let βj (xj ) denote the highest price that j bids for that package 
during the course of the auction, with βj (xj ) ≡ 0 if no bid is made on the package. 
Given such a profile of “reported values” β, we define x β(S) ∊ arg maxx∊X  ∑ j∊S     β j (xj )
and w β(S) =  ∑ j∊S       β j ( x j β (S)). These definitions are exactly analogous to the defini-
tions of x (S) and w (S) using the “actual” values v.
Associated with any allocation is a payoff vector or imputation π given by π0 =  ∑ j∊N     τ j and, for j ∊ N, πj = vj (xj ) − τj . An imputation corresponds to a feasible 
allocation if π0 +  ∑ j∊N       π j ≤ w (N ). A feasible allocation (x, τ) is a core allocation 
and the corresponding imputation π is a core imputation if π is individually rational 
4 Formally, the simultaneous ascending auction (SAA), without explicit package bids, is another total-bid maxi-
mizing auction if one specifies that the bid for any package at any round is the sum of the individual bid prices on 
the lots included in the package. Theorem 2 can then be usefully applied to the SAA as well.
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(πi ≥ 0 for i ∊ N ∪ {0}) and satisfies the no-blocking inequalities π0 +  ∑ j∊S     π j ≥ 
w(S) for every set of bidders S. We denote by Core(N, X, v) the set of all core alloca-
tions for the package allocation problem (N, X, (vj )j∊N ).
We can similarly define the reported core allocations and imputations by replac-
ing w by wβ and using reported profits π j β  = βj (xj ) − τj. An auction is total-bid-max-
imizing if for every profile of bids β, it selects an assignment x ∊ arg maxz∊X  ∑ j∊N     β j(zj ). It is standard if, in addition, for every profile of reported values, it selects a 
reported core allocation (x, τ ) ∊ Core(N, X, β).
We say that a set of bidders S is core-relevant if there is some core imputation π, 
such that π0 +  ∑ i∊S     π i = w(S). Then, for each j ∊ S, the package xj (S) is bidder j’s 
core-relevant package. Similarly, the package xj (N ) is j’s efficiency-relevant pack-
age. By a standard property of systems of linear inequalities, the core imputations 
are those satisfying π0 +  ∑ j∊S     π j ≥ w(S) for every core-relevant set of bidders S. 
According to the next two theorems, it is sufficiently aggressive bidding (as defined 
by a certain inequality) on relevant packages that leads an auction to result in core 
allocations or efficient allocations.
THEOREM 1: In a standard package auction, suppose the outcome ( _ x , τ )is indi-
vidually rational and let β denote the final bids in the auction. If for all core-relevant 
sets of bidders S and for all j ∊ S, vj (xj (S)) − βj (xj (S)) ≤ vj ( _ x j ) − βj ( _ x j ), then ( _ x , τ ) ∊ Core(N, X, v).
PROOF 1: 
Since individual rationality is given, we need only establish the feasibility and the 
no-blocking inequalities.
For feasibility, observe that w(N )  ≥   ∑ j∊N     v j ( _ x j ) = π0 +  ∑ j∊N     π j . The first 
inequality follows from the definition of w(N ), the second from the definition of the 
imputations.
For no-blocking, let S be a relevant set of bidders. In a standard auction:
(1)   π 0 β +  ∑ 
j∊S
 
 
    π j β ≥ w β(S)
 = maxz∊X  ∑ 
j∊S
 
 
   β j (zj )
 ≥   ∑ 
j∊S
 
 
   β j (xj (S))
  ≥   ∑ 
j∊S
 
 
   ( vj (xj (S)) − vj (( _ x j )) + βj ( _ x j ))
 = w(S) −  ∑ 
j∊S
 
 
   ( vj ( _ x j ) − τj ) +  ∑ 
j∊S
 
 
   ( βj ( _ x j ) − τj )
 = w(S) −  ∑ 
j∊S
 
 
   ( πj  −  π j β ).
The first inequality holds because the auction is standard and selects an allocation 
( _ x , τ) ∊ Core(N, X, β). The second line is the definition of wβand the third follows 
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from maximization. The fourth follows from the hypothesis of the theorem and the 
last two lines merely rearrange terms and apply definitions. Comparing the first and 
last terms and recalling that  π 0 β =  ∑ j∊N     τ j = π0, we have w(S) ≤ π0 +  ∑ j∊S     π j, so 
the coalitional no-blocking constraints are satisfied.
THEOREM 2: In a total-bid maximizing package auction, let β denote the final bids 
in the auction and ( _ x , τ) the auction outcome. If for all bidders j, vj (xj (N ))  − βj (xj (N )) ≤  vj ( _ x j ) − βj ( _ x j ), then the goods assignment  _ x is efficient:  ∑ j∊N     v j ( _ x j )= w(N ). If the efficient goods assignment is unique, then the condition vj (xj (N )) − βj (xj (N )) ≤ vj ( _ x j ) − βj ( _ x j ) is necessary as well as sufficient for  _ x to be efficient.
PROOF 2: 
We calculate as follows:
(2)  ∑ 
j∊N
 
 
   v j ( _ x j ) =  ∑ 
j∊N
 
 
   β j ( _ x j ) +  ∑ 
j∊N
 
 
   ( vj ( _ x j ) − βj ( _ x j ))
 ≥   ∑ 
j∊N
 
 
   β j (xj (N )) +  ∑ 
j∊N
 
 
   ( vj ( _ x j ) − βj ( _ x j ))
 ≥   ∑ 
j∊N
 
 
   v j (xj (N )) = w(N ).
The first equality is an identity. The first inequality is justified by the definition 
of a total-bid-maximizing package auction. The second inequality follows from the 
hypothesis of the theorem and the final equality follows from the definition of xj (N ). 
That proves the first assertion.
For the second, suppose that  
_ x is efficient. Since the efficient goods assignment is 
assumed to be unique,  
_ x = x(N ), so vi (xi(N )) − βi (xi (N )) = vi ( _ x i) − βi ( _ x i). 
Informally, the theorems say that if bidders bid sufficiently aggressively for their 
efficiency-relevant or core-relevant packages in some particular auction, then the 
outcome is efficient or in the core, respectively. The conditions in these theorems 
are implied by equilibrium conditions in certain complete information auction 
mechanisms (Bernheim and Whinston 1986; Ausubel and Milgrom 2002; Day and 
Milgrom 2007). In the selected Nash equilibria of these earlier papers, bidders bid 
equally aggressively on all packages, so the conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied 
and the equilibrium outcomes are core allocations.
As previously observed, the sheer number of possible packages in a large auc-
tion ensures that a bidder can bid on only a subset of its profitable packages. What 
might guide bidders in such settings to bid on their relevant packages, as the theo-
rem requires? In experiments, various cues could influence bids. A subject might 
bid for a regional package of spectrum licenses because that package appears to be 
most profitable at the quoted prices, or because the bidder’s role in the experiment is 
labeled “regional bidder,” or because the experiment assigns the bidder low or zero 
values for licenses outside the named region, or because the bidder enjoys value 
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synergies only among licenses in that region, etc. Yet such cues may be weak and are 
equally available to bidders in different combinatorial auction mechanisms.
We conjecture that the CCA and similar mechanisms, ones in which the informa-
tion feedback in each round consists of information about winning bids and pro-
posed prices, can perform consistently well in a class of environments only if bidder 
strategies using only that information can identify the relevant packages in those 
environments. To formalize that conjecture, we simulate auction results using auto-
mated bidders programmed to bid at each round only for the most profitable bundle 
at the prevailing prices. In some settings, the simulation does lead reliably to effi-
cient or core allocations, but in others, it does not. Our conjecture is then that varia-
tions mechanism performance across different environments will be well predicted 
by the simulation results.
To summarize, our proposed analysis of package bidding thus entails two central 
hypotheses:
 • In price-guided package auctions, at each round, bidders bid for many fewer 
packages than are profitable at the current round prices. When there are 
many items for sale, it is typically impossible for bidders to bid on even a 
small fraction of the full set of packages. But even with fewer items, subjects 
may be unwilling to spend the effort to bid for many packages. And, it may 
not serve the bidder’s interest to bid for multiple packages, because that may 
drive up prices for other preferred bundles. In our design, bidders with provi-
sionally winning bids may refrain from bidding at higher prices in the hopes 
of winning at a low price. Without specifying any single reason, our hypoth-
esis here is that bidders bid for only one or a few packages even in small-scale 
auctions like those in our experiment.
 • Simulations in which automated bidders bid only for the currently most prof-
itable package will lead to (near) core or efficient outcomes in the same envi-
ronments where experimental outcomes lead to approximate core or efficient 
outcomes. This hypothesis is based on the idea that much of what subjects 
do during an auction experiment is irrelevant. The auction outcome is guided 
mainly by bidders responding myopically in each round to price signals and 
bidding for the currently most profitable package.
For our experiment, we have identified two features that could subtly affect the 
experimental findings. First, in most of the cases we examine, the bidders have only 
one core-relevant package, which makes it much easier for their bids to satisfy the 
conditions of Theorem 1. Second, in the version of the CCA that we investigate, bid-
ders are informed when they have a provisionally winning bid. That has turned out 
to be a consequential decision. The provisionally winning bidder status may become 
a trap if the bidder, perhaps hoping to get a low price, declines to increase its bid 
while it remains a provisional winner. By the time its status changes and its bid is 
no longer a provisional winner, prices may have risen too high to make it profitable 
to bid again. In terms of the theorems, we can describe these situations as failures of 
bidders to bid sufficiently aggressively for the relevant packages.
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In addition to reporting statistics about these two hypotheses, we also report on 
certain aspects of bidder behavior and we compare the performance of the CCA to 
a nonpackage auction alternative, the SAA auction. For bidder behavior, we ask, 
‘In our package design, do the provisionally winning bidders stand pat or make 
new bids?’ ‘In the nonpackage design, when there is an exposure problem, how do 
bidders respond?’ ‘Do they withdraw, avoiding losses but possibly missing out on 
potential profits?’ ‘Or do they continue to bid and risk suffering losses?’ For evalu-
ating performance, we analyze the auctions in terms of efficiency, revenue, bidder 
profits, distance to the core, and number of rounds to completion.
Before summarizing our findings, we describe the details of the experimental 
design.
II. Experimental Design and Procedures5
We conducted auctions for either four or six items. Since we use similar value 
structures in both cases, we give a detailed description only for the six-item case, as 
illustrated in Figure 1.
There were three bidders in each auction. The north “regional bidder” had a posi- 
tive value only for items A, B, and C, and earned a positive synergy value in case 
it acquired two adjacent items, either A and B (henceforth AB) or B and C (hence-
forth BC). If the bidder acquired ABC, it enjoyed two synergy values. Similarly, 
there was a south regional bidder with positive value for items D, E, and F, with 
zero value for the other items, and with identical, positive synergies between items 
5 The full set of instructions, which includes sample screen shots, is available at http://www.econ.
ohio-state.edu/kagel/KLM_instructions.pdf.
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Figure 1. Valuations for Six-Item Experiment
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D and E and items E and F. Finally, there was a “global bidder” with positive value 
for all six items and identical synergies for all adjacent pairs: AB, BC, DE, EF, 
AD, BE, and CF.
For our simulations and the experiment, the stand-alone values for the regional 
bidders were integers from the interval [5, 75]. There was a single synergy value for 
each bidder between any pair of adjacent items, which was an integer from [5, 15] 
in the low synergy regime or from [25, 35] in the high synergy regime. The high- or 
low-synergy regime was in place for both regional bidders at the same time and was 
announced prior to each auction. The stand-alone values for global bidders were 
integer values from [5, 45] and synergy values were integers from [25, 35]. An online 
data file records the actual value profiles used in our experiment.
The four-item auctions were the same as the six-item auctions, but with stand-
alone items C and F dropped. In both cases bidders knew the auction structure—as 
they were provided with a copy of Figure 1, as well as a detailed description of the 
possible synergy relationships and stand-alone values. However, in any particular 
auction they got to see only their own valuations.
After the simulations, we selected valuations for the experiment that we deemed 
useful for testing hypothesis 2. We chose some cases in which repeated simula-
tions of the CCA were 100 percent efficient (“easy” cases) and others in which 
they were not (“hard” cases).6 We then selected certain easy and hard cases for the 
four-item and six-item treatments (see Table 5 below for the number of valuations 
in each category).
During the analysis phase to follow, we also make some additional distinctions. 
We distinguish between medium-hard and very-hard cases depending on the avail-
ability of nonprice cues that may help bidders to identify their efficiency-relevant 
packages—a distinction that our theory suggests could influence the efficiency of 
outcomes. And, in analyzing distances from the core, we distinguish cases accord-
ing to how close the simulation outcomes are to core allocations.
A. CCA Auctions
Our auctions were run using a variant of the CCA rules of Porter et al. (2003). 
Subjects could bid on one or more packages, such as the package ABC (containing 
A, B and C). Bids for each bidder were XOR bids, meaning that only one of the bids 
could be a provisionally winning bid in any given round of the auction. In the CCA, 
when a bid won, the bidder was assigned all the items in its winning package and 
only those items.
In each round, bidders observed the prices for each item and decided about which 
packages to bid on. Each resulting package bid is a pair consisting of the named 
package and a single package price equal to the sum of the current round prices of 
the included items. Subjects could submit as many package bids as they wished. 
At the end of each round, tentative winning bids were determined from among all 
current and past bids by finding the feasible combination that maximized seller 
6 Repeated simulations may lead to different results because ties for the high bid are resolved randomly. 
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revenue.7 Prices associated with past bids were based on prices in the round in 
which the bids were originally placed.
Prices for all items started at 5 ECUs (experimental currency units), and prices 
were raised according to the following rules. Look at the set of provisionally winning 
bids in the previous round and the set of new bids in the current round. If an item 
attracts a new bid from two or more bidders, or if it is named in a provisionally win-
ning bid and a new bid, then its price is raised by 5 ECUs. Otherwise, the item price 
remains the same.8 Thus, by looking at which items had price increases for the current 
round, bidders could easily identify items for which others were actively competing.
Following each round, bidders were privately informed about which, if any, of 
their bids was provisionally winning. 9
Subjects were encouraged to place bids on multiple potentially profitable pack-
ages, particularly early on as “ … the opportunity to make profitable bids on individ-
ual items or packages with low synergies, which may become provisional winners 
later in the auction, will only be present early in the auction.”10 There were no activ-
ity rules restricting the items subjects could bid on.
An auction ended after two consecutive rounds of no new bids or, what amounts 
to the same thing, no price increases. Two rounds were used to give everyone a 
chance to determine whether they were satisfied, given current prices, with their 
provisionally winning allocations.
B. SAA Auctions
Our SAA screen was designed to look the same as the CCA screen, so that differ-
ences in comparative performance could not be attributed to differences in presenta-
tion. The rules were also designed to be as similar as possible. Like the CCA, the SAA 
proceeded in a series of 25-second rounds. And, like the CCA, a subject only had to 
click “set” next to any set of items to place a bid on those items. However, unlike the 
CCA, an SAA bidder could only make one such bid and that bid was interpreted and 
processed as a collection of independent item bids rather than as a package bid.
In each round, for each item with excess demand, the price was increased by 5 
ECUs. The auction ended once there was no longer excess demand for any item, and 
each item was sold at the current price. Thus, a bidder who bid more than his or her 
stand-alone value for an individual item, in order to capture the synergy payoff, was 
exposed to a possible loss from winning just one item and paying more than its stand-
alone value. Our version of the SAA had a number of rules and features not present in 
the CCA.
7 Ties for tentative winning bids, which are to be expected early on in the auction, were broken randomly with 
priority given to tentative winners in the previous round if prices did not change. Ties become less of a concern in 
later stages of the auction.
8 Prices were thus weakly increasing from round to round, unlike RAD (Kwasnica et al. 2005) or the FCC’s 
Modified Package Bidding.
9 Tentative winning bids were not announced in either the original Porter et al. (2003) experiment or in Brunner 
et al. (2007). 
10 In a mechanism design experiment, the instructions are an important part of the treatment as bidders are 
informed of the favorable properties and operation of what will typically be a novel institution. 
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Activity Requirement.—Each auction started with bidders eligible to bid on all 
items—six in this case. In subsequent rounds, the total number of items a bidder was 
eligible to bid on could not exceed the number bid on in the previous round. This 
activity rule, which resembles the rule used in spectrum auctions, was explained to 
bidders as necessary to have the auction close in a timely manner.
Default Bids.—Each round of the auction started with a default bid labeled “cur-
rently demanded bid” which was the previous round’s bid (or a bid on all items in the 
first round of bidding). Any time a new bid was entered that reduced eligibility, the 
bidder was notified and required to reconfirm the bid.11
Minimum Bid Requirement.—Once there was no longer any excess demand for 
an item, the current high bidder could not withdraw the bid for that item, with this 
requirement in effect until someone else topped that bid. This minimum bid require-
ment held regardless of whether there was a positive profit on the item (or set of 
items) in question.
Price Rollback Rule.—Given the indivisibilities inherent in the fixed-price increase 
rule, near the end of an auction it would not be unusual for two bidders to drop their 
demand for the same item at the same time, moving from excess demand to zero 
demand. This could result in unsold items with a potentially large, negative impact on 
efficiency. A price rollback rule, described in detail in the experimental instructions, 
was designed to deal with this situation.12 This rule randomly assigned the item in 
question to one of the bidders demanding the item in the previous round, at the previ-
ous round’s price.
C. Computer Interface and Aids for Subjects
Auctions with multiple items and synergies among them are quite complicated 
for subjects, so the nature of the bidder interface and any analytic tools it includes 
can affect bidder behavior, and hence, experimental outcomes. Since we intended 
the experiment to be representative of high-quality field implementations, we aimed 
to have as friendly a computer interface as possible, as well as to provide subjects 
with computational aids they might expect to have from support staff in a field 
setting. These aids consisted of a table listing all possible bids, with correspond-
ing analytic information, so that subjects could bid on items by simply clicking 
on the “add” or “set” space next to packages they were interested in. To make it 
easy for bidders to compare alternative packages, the table could be sorted using a 
number of potentially relevant criteria (e.g., current cost, current profit, etc.).13 A 
11 An earlier set of SAA auctions showed that without these proactive procedures a number of subjects let
their eligibility lapse well before it was profitable to do so. See the online Appendix at http://www.econ.ohio-state.
edu/kagel/KLM2010AppendixOnline.pdf for a comparison of outcomes in these earlier SAA auctions with the ones 
reported on here. 
12 The minimum bid requirement would not apply in this case, as there would be no current high bidder for the 
item in question.
13 See the online instructions for complete details regarding this and the rest of the bidder aids provided.
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 double-criterion sort routine was employed so that a bidder interested in comparing 
a particular group of bids could do so easily. In the case of the six-item auctions, 
this was adapted so that the sort routines for regional bidders first sorted based on 
packages containing only those items with positive values, followed by all remain-
ing packages.14 The same set of aids was provided for the SAA and CCA auctions.
D. Experimental Procedures
Subjects were recruited to participate in a series of three sessions taking place 
within a two-week period, with each session lasting for approximately two hours. 
Within each series, all of the auctions had the same auction mechanism—SAA or 
CCA—and the same number of items (four or six). The first meeting was a training 
session where subjects were introduced to the experimental procedures and com-
puter interface, followed by three dry runs, which were all that could be completed 
in the initial two-hour period. To insure a high return rate, subjects were offered 
a $30 participation fee, to be paid only after the completion of all three sessions, 
and half of session 2’s profits from the auctions were similarly withheld until the 
completion of all three sessions. In addition, subjects were paid a flat $10 at the end 
of the initial training session in lieu of any earnings from the dry runs. Given the 
complicated nature of the auctions, subjects were permitted to take the instructions 
home. Earnings in sessions 2 and 3 were advertised to range between $10 and $60 
or more per person, with average earnings of $30–$40 per person. Payoffs were 
denominated in experimental currency units (ECUs), with a minimum conversion 
rate of 1 ECU = $0.20.15 Subjects were provided with starting capital balances of 
150 ECUs. Any profits earned in an auction were added to these starting capital bal-
ances, and losses subtracted from it, with total earnings for a session consisting of a 
subject’s end-of-session balance, less 130 ECUs, but not less than zero.
Subjects’ roles as a regional or global bidder were randomly determined prior to 
each auction, with bidders in each auction group randomly rematched following each 
auction. Each experimental session was designed to have five or more auctions (all 
with the same valuations) running at the same time. In case the number of subjects 
was not a multiple of three, the extras became observers for that auction, and were 
guaranteed to be active in the next auction. Subjects’ computer screens reported only 
their own outcome until the end of the auction, when the full allocation of units to all 
bidders in their auction was reported along with a final analytics screen that they could 
play with. The latter was designed to give bidders a chance to see what profitable 
packages (according to the ending prices) they might have missed bidding on.
Each auction began with a notification to bidders about their valuations. Bidders 
were then given a couple of minutes to sort packages and to check any items/pack-
ages they might be particularly interested in. The six-item auctions started out 
14 Automatic check marks for regional bidders were only employed in the six-item auctions. These were initi-
ated on account of the increased number of packages available to bid on. In the four-item auctions, bidders could 
effectively see all the packages on a single screen so the risk of mistakenly choosing dominated packages was not 
as severe. 
15 In some sessions, the total subject earnings at the minimum conversion rate was very low, so we adjusted the 
conversion rate upward after completion of the session. 
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with each auction round lasting 25 seconds. After round 6 or 7, the round time was 
reduced to 20 seconds, and it was reduced further to 15 seconds after round 12 or so, 
to speed things up. Once these shorter round times went into effect, the auctioneer 
announced “round ending” a second or two prior to the round actually ending.16
Table 1 lists the auction sessions conducted, along with the number of subjects 
and the number of different valuations employed in each session.17 Subjects were 
recruited through e-mail lists of students taking economics classes at Ohio State 
University in academic year 2006–2007. For subjects completing all three sessions, 
average earnings per subject for the six-item auctions were $174, with minimum 
earnings of $90 and maximum earnings of $331, including the $30 show-up fee 
and the $10 payment for the first session. Average earnings per subject for the four-
item auctions were $125, with minimum earnings of $51 and maximum earnings of 
$243, including the $30 show-up fee and the $10 payment for the first session.
III. Experimental Results
By design, our analysis is organized into easy and hard groups of parameters. In 
our CCA simulations, bidders bid on the most profitable packages equally in the 
easy and hard cases, so it will be interesting to test whether experimental subjects 
16 Four-item auctions, which were conducted first, had fixed round times of 25 seconds. The procedure was 
changed in anticipation of a larger number of rounds in the six-item auctions. Bidders appeared to have no trouble 
keeping up with this pace of rounds; they were canvassed regarding whether or not they had enough time to bid on 
all the packages they wanted to both during and after the pilot sessions. Some even complained that the pace was 
too slow. 
17 There were two sets of pilot experiments, which are not reported for both CCA and SAA auctions. They 
were used to refine the auction mechanisms so they would run smoothly and quickly, as well as our experimental 
procedures (e.g., would it really take most of two hours to go over the software and run a handful of auctions?). 
The number of valuations employed in each session was determined in advance. The same set of valuations was 
employed in the same sequence between corresponding CCA and SAA auctions. The number of auctions was not 
announced in advance. 
Table 1—Experimental Treatments
Number of subjectsa
Session Session 1b Session 2 Session 3
Combinatorial clock auction (CCA)
4 items 22 
(3)
20
(9)
18
(8)
6 items 19
(3)
18
(9)
16
(10)
Simultaneous ascending auction (SAA)
4 items 21
(3)
20
(9)
19
(8)
6 items 21
(3)
21
(9)
19
(10)
a  Number of auction valuations in each session in parentheses. Same subjects participated 
in a given series (e.g., CCA with four items). Number of subjects decreases over sessions 
due to attrition.
b  Data from Session 1, the training sessions, are not included in the analysis.
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behave in the same way. We begin by showing that they do indeed. We then pool 
data from the two cases to report the characteristics of individual bidder behavior 
that our theory suggests can be consequential for auction outcomes. Finally, we 
compare the performance of the two auction mechanisms in terms of efficiency, 
seller revenues, bidder profits, distance from the core, and rounds to completion.
A. Patterns of Individual Bidding
Subjects’ bidding behavior in the CCA auctions exhibits a number of consistent 
characteristics that our theory identifies as consequential.
First, as hypothesized, bidders bid on only a small number of profitable packages, 
with the most profitable package attracting the most attention. Further, these pat-
terns do not differ materially between hard versus easy auctions. This is potentially 
important, because if subjects bid on more packages in one of the cases, that would 
make it more likely that they bid on any particular relevant package in that case.
Table 2 summarizes these data. Columns 2 and 5 of Table 2 report the aver-
age number of packages bid on in each round, along with the number of profit-
able packages available to bid on (in parentheses) for global and regional bidders, 
respectively. The columns following these show where the bids were directed in 
terms of the percentage of times subjects bid on the most profitable and second-most 
Table 2—Packages Bid on in CCA Auctionsa
Global bidders Regional biddersb
Distribution of bidsd Distribution of bidsd
Average  
number of 
bidsc
Percent
most 
profitable
Percent
2nd most 
profitable
Average
number of 
bidsc
Percent
most 
profitable
Percent
2nd most 
profitable
CCA4 Auctions
Rounds 1–5 3.9
(13.8)
76.7 43.9 1.5 
(2.8)
91.0 44.4
Rounds 6–10 1.6
(7.4)
81.7 16.6 1.2
(2.3)
84.7 35.3
Rounds 11–15 1.3
(4.2)
86.6 19.4 1.1
(2.1)
87.5 26.3
Rounds > 15 1.2(3.6)
87. 5 12.5 1.1
(1.8)
89.1 15.5
CCA6 Auctions
Rounds 1–5 11.5
(60.5)
79.0 55.4 3.1
(6.8)
81.1 54.6
Rounds 6–10 2.6
(35.7)
72.9 32.4 1.9
(5.5)
77.7 45.6
Rounds 11–15 2.0
(13.3)
85.2 27.2 1.5
(3.9)
78.6 40.2
Rounds > 15 1.3(6.9)
86.8 13.9 1.3
(3.2)
93.1 26.3
a  Data are only included for rounds in which a bidder is not a provisional winner, had at least one profitable pack-
age to bid on, and a bid was submitted.
b Only includes packages where all items had positive value for regional bidders.
c In parentheses are average number of profitable packages available to bid on.
d  Percentages add up to more than 100 percent as subjects bid on the most profitable package as well as the sec-
ond most profitable package.
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profitable packages, respectively.18 Data are excluded for the last two rounds of 
each auction where by definition there are no new bids as well as rounds in which 
the bidder is a provisional winner (which will be covered in detail below). So, for 
example, in rounds 1–5 in the CCA4 auctions, global players bid on 3.9 packages 
per round on average (out of 13.8 profitable packages available to bid on ), of which 
76.7 percent were directed at the most profitable package.
As predicted, players bid on only a small number of the profitable packages at 
each round and omitted bidding on others. They did so even in later rounds when 
there were relatively few profitable packages—e.g., in rounds 11–15 in the CCA6 
auctions, global bidders bid on only 2.0 out of 13.3 profitable packages available to 
bid on.19 Further, we are unable to reject a null hypothesis in any of the cells that the 
number of packages bid on is the same between easy versus hard auctions. Nor can 
we reject a null hypothesis that subjects direct their bids to the most profitable and 
second most profitable packages with equal frequencies in hard versus easy cases.20
To summarize, players bid on only a small percentage of the profitable packages 
in each round and omit some packages entirely from their bidding during the auc-
tion; bids are largely directed at the most profitable packages; and we are unable 
to reject a null hypothesis that the number of packages bid on, and the frequency 
of bidding on the most profitable package, are the same between hard versus easy 
auctions.
If CCA prices fail to guide effective bidding, and bidders bid on only few pack-
ages in each round, our theoretical conditions could still be satisfied if bidders bid 
sufficiently aggressively on all of their packages at appropriate times during the auc-
tion. But this is far from what we observe. A global bidder on average bids at least 
once on only 6.0 distinct packages out of the 15 packages they could bid on during 
the course of a CCA4 auction. In other words, on average 9.0 packages never receive 
any bid at all from the global bidder during the auction (and hence correspond to a 
reported value of zero). Regional bidders come closer to the necessary requirement: 
on average, they bid at least once during the auction on 2.1 distinct packages out of 3 
packages. For CCA6, the averages are 17.6 out of 63 packages for the global bidders 
and 5.1 out of 7 packages for the regional bidders.
Second, most losing bidders in the auction had fully exhausted their profit oppor-
tunities on their selected packages by the last bidding round. This behavior is part of 
the sufficient conditions for both Theorems 1 and 2.
Table 3 reports the scope for potential profits available at the end of the auction, 
distinguishing between losing and winning bidders. The most notable element here 
is the difference between regional and global bidders in the frequency with which 
losing bidders could have possibly obtained higher positive profits by continuing 
to bid, averaging 6.7 percent for global bidders versus 25.0 percent for regional 
18 These percentages are independent of each other in that a bid on the second most profitable package is 
counted regardless of whether or not a bid was placed on the most profitable package. 
19 In repeated canvassing, the subjects indicated that they had enough time to bid on all the packages they 
wanted, so this finding is not driven by time limits in the auction. 
20 These statistical tests involved two-tailed ( p = 0.05) nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank tests with average 
subject data as the unit of observation. The data corresponding to Table 2 broken out by hard versus easy cases is 
reported in the online Appendix http://www.econ.ohio-state.edu/kagel/KLM2010AppendixOnline.pdf.
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 bidders. These differences, which are statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
in a random-effects probit (controlling for repeated measures for the same subject), 
suggest a threshold problem; one, or both, of the regional bidders bids less aggres-
sively, hoping that the other will cause prices to increase sufficiently to defeat the 
global bidder. The magnitude of the foregone profits was not that large averaging 
14.9 and 32.1 ECUs in CCA4 and CCA6 auctions, respectively.
There are no comparable differences between global and regional bidders when 
they were winning with respect to foregone (potential) profits. This reinforces the 
notion of a threshold problem for losing bidders.
Our third observation is that bidders tend to bid much more often on their most 
profitable package than on their less profitable packages. Note, however, that the 
mere fact that the most profitable packages attract the most bids cannot prove that 
bidders are guided primarily by prices and profits. The same packages might be 
selected by other criteria. In many cases, particularly early on, the most profitable 
package and the “named” package coincide. The latter is the package of all items 
for the global bidder and the package of all positively valued items for the regional 
bidders. To establish the degree to which prices and profits guide bidding, we focus 
on those cases where named packages were different from the most profitable ones. 
Table 4 reports these data for the regional bidders. As shown, when there was a con-
flict between the named package and the most profitable package, and bidders chose 
to bid on only one of the two, the most profitable package attracts more attention 
from regional bidders in all rounds, often by a wide margin. Note, however, that the 
named package, or the named package and the most profitable package together, 
Table 3 —Scope for Increased Profit at End of Auctions
Bidder type
Frequency higher 
profits were  
availablea
(percent)
Average foregone 
(potential) profits in 
ECUsb
CCA4 Auctions
Losing bidders Global
Regional
4.5
(3/66)
25.5
(12/47)
12.0
(7.6)
14.9
(15.6)
Winning bidders Global
Regional
16.7
(6/36)
6.4
(10/157)
 61.2
(51.8)
20.3
(29.8)
CCA6 Auctions
Losing bidders Global
Regional
9.4
(5/53)
24.7
(19/77)
 45.2
(40.7)
32.1
(9.5)
Winning bidders Global
Regional
9.8
(5/51)
9.9
(13/131)
 52.4
(16.4)
23.7
(7.7)
a Raw data in parentheses.
b Standard error of the mean in parentheses.
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still attract a reasonable percentage of bids—which as shown below, has conse-
quences for the actual data versus the simulation model.
Table 4 leaves out data for global bidders, as there were very few cases (2 for 
CCA4; 12 for CCA6) where the named package was not the most profitable pack-
age in a given round. Averaging over these few cases, only the most profitable pack-
age was bid on 42.8 percent of the time, with only the named package bid on 14.3 
percent of the time, and both of them bid on 14.3 percent of the time—a pattern not 
unlike that reported for the regional bidders.
Finally, subjects typically did not place bids in rounds in which they were provi-
sional winners. This effect was most pronounced in later rounds, when the auction 
had a greater chance of ending immediately. In auction rounds 11 and above, global 
(regional) bidders failed to submit new bids in 95.9 percent (89.2 percent) of all 
rounds in which they were provisional winners in CCA4 auctions, and in 90.6 per-
cent (87.3 percent) for the CCA6 auctions.21 The reasons for these high frequencies 
are threefold: subjects do not bid in every round even when they are not provisional 
winners (see below); bidding on packages as a provisional winner can extend the 
auction and/or raise prices on provisionally winning bids with unknown conse-
quences, so that provisional winners were willing to settle for what they already had; 
and given the bid patterns, more often than not the profit on the provisionally win-
ning package was greater than or equal to the potential profit from any new package 
that could be bid on.
On this last point, in rounds 11 and higher, provisionally winning bidders rarely 
bid in a round in which their provisional profit was higher than they could earn on 
any new bid, with no new bids in 98.9 percent (95.5 percent) of all such cases for 
21 For rounds 1–10, the corresponding percentages are 81.1 percent and 88.0 percent for global and regional 
bidders in CCA4 auctions and 63.6 percent and 71.1 percent for global and regional bidders in CCA6 auctions, 
respectively.
Table 4 —Package Bids in CCA Auctions when Named Package No Longer the 
Most Profitable Bida
Regional bidders
(number cases)
Percent
most profitable 
only
Percent
named package 
only
Percent both most 
profitable and 
named
CCA4 Auctions
Rounds 1–5 (16) 43.8 6.3 18.8
Rounds 6–10 (126) 42.1 9.5 14.3
Rounds 11–15 (98) 50.0 9.2 10.4
Rounds 16–20 (35) 40.0 11.4 5.7
Rounds > 20 (12) 41.7 16.7 0.0
CCA6 Auctions
Rounds 1–5 (7) 57.1 0.0 14.3
Rounds 6–10 (105) 27.6 12.4 20.0
Rounds 11–15 (92) 26.1 9.8 10.9
Rounds 16–20 (12) 58.3 8.3 8.3
Rounds > 20 (9) 33.3 22.2 11.1
a  Observations for which named package is not profitable are dropped. When a provisional 
winner does not bid, or the auction is in the last round, observations are dropped.
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global (regional) bidders in the CCA4 auctions, and for 96.8 percent (88.7 percent) 
of all such cases for global (regional) bidders in the CCA6 auctions. Provisional 
winners stood pat somewhat less often when there was greater potential profit to 
be had on another package, with no new bids in 82.1 percent (57.9 percent) of 
all such cases for global (regional) bidders in the CCA4 auctions, and 61.8 per-
cent (76.9 percent) of all cases for global (regional) bidders in the CCA6 auctions. 
Bidders were substantially more likely to bid following a round in which they had 
not secured a provisionally winning bid, bidding in 70.4 percent (60.7 percent) of 
all such cases in the CCA4 and in 75.7 percent (73.8 percent) of all cases for global 
(regional) bidders for CCA6 auctions. Finally, looking at those cases in which a 
provisionally winning bidder did not bid and was not winning on her most profit-
able package, the profit difference compared to their best alternative averaged 31.1 
(13.2) ECUs for global (regional) bidders in the CCA4 auctions, and 54.7 (13.5) 
ECUs in the CCA6 auctions.
B. Efficiency
Efficiency is calculated as (Sactual − Srandom)/(Smax − Srandom), where Sactual is the 
actual realized surplus from the auction, Srandom is the mean surplus resulting from a 
random allocation, and Smax is the maximum possible surplus.
22 With this measure, 
in every environment, the mean efficiency of a random assignment of goods is 0 
percent and the efficiency of a surplus-maximizing assignment is 100 percent.
Table 5 reports efficiency for CCA and SAA auctions with 4 and 6 items, catego-
rizing the results into the previously defined easy (where the simulations achieve 
100 percent efficiency) and hard cases (all other cases). Average efficiency is sig-
nificantly higher in easy compared to hard CCA auctions, for both 4-item and 6-item 
22 The value of the random allocation is computed by taking the average of the surplus over all possible alloca-
tions—34 and 36, respectively—assuming all items are sold in each auction.
Table 5—Outcomes in Easy versus Hard Package Auction Outcomes. 
CCA Efficiency SAA Efficiency
Averageb
Percent of 
auctions 
achieving 100% 
efficiency Averageb
Percent of 
auctions 
achieving 100% 
efficiency
4-item auctions Easy
(9)a
95.7%
(2.0)
88.9 82.2%
(3.1)
50.0
Hard
(8)a
91.5%
(1.6)
35.4 92.9%
(1.6)
50.0
6-item auctions Easy
(7)a
95.3%
(1.8)
82.1 83.9%
(2.0)
28.3
Hard
(12)a
92.4%
(1.2)
40.0 90.9%
(1.1)
32.5
a Number of value profiles. 
b Standard error of the mean in parentheses.
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cases ( p < 0.01).23 More dramatic yet are the differences in the frequency with 
which easy CCA auctions achieve 100 percent efficiency, averaging over 80 percent 
versus 40 percent or less for hard CCA auctions ( p < 0.01 for both cases).
These efficiency differences between easy versus hard support hypothesis 2, as 
the data summarized in the previous section are at least qualitatively consistent with 
the assumptions used in the simulations. Subjects bid on only a limited number of 
packages often including the currently most profitable ones. This suggests that the 
simulator may work more generally to distinguish hard versus easy environments 
for the CCA to achieve efficient outcomes.
As noted above, in our experiment, bidders do not rely solely on profits to decide 
which packages to bid on (recall Table 4). Bidders also bid on the named packages, 
even when they are not the most profitable ones. In the following we show how this 
behavior affects the efficiency of outcomes.
A closer look at auctions within the hard category show important and systematic 
differences. Although all the auctions in the hard category fail to achieve 100 per-
cent efficiency in the simulations, for a number of these auctions the named pack-
ages correspond to the relevant packages, thereby attracting some attention even 
when they were not the most profitable packages.24 In what follows, we will refer to 
these as “medium-hard” auctions. For the remaining auctions in the hard category, 
the relevant packages in terms of hypothesis 2 either involve all bidders getting one 
or more items, or splitting items between one of the regional bidders and the global 
bidder. This second subset of auctions, which we will refer to as “very hard,” had 
lower average efficiency than the medium-hard auctions in the simulations.25
Table 6 reports efficiencies for the medium-hard and very-hard auctions, as well 
as repeating the efficiency numbers for the easy auctions from Table 5. First, notice 
that average efficiency is substantially lower in the very-hard CCA auctions compared 
to either the easy or the medium-hard CCA auctions, as is the frequency with which 
these auctions achieve 100 percent efficiency ( p < 0.01 in all cases). The medium-hard 
CCA auctions are much more comparable in terms of average efficiency to the easy 
CCA auctions than to the very hard CCA auctions. They achieve slightly higher aver-
age efficiency in the easy CCA4 auctions and slightly lower average efficiency in the 
easy CCA6 auctions.26 Medium-hard CCA auctions achieve 100 percent efficiency less 
often than the easy CCA auctions, with the difference significant at the 5 percent level 
for CCA6, and just missing statistical significance ( p = 0.102) for CCA4.27
23 Statistical tests comparing between CCA auctions in Tables 5, 6, and 8 are all one-tailed as they are based 
on simulated outcomes with clear predictions. Comparisons between CCA and SAA auctions in these tables are all 
two-tailed. Nonparametric Mann-Whitney tests continue to be used when conducting pair-wise tests for differences 
in average efficiency between cases. Binomial tests are used when conducting pair-wise tests for differences in 
frequencies of achieving 100 percent efficiency between cases. 
24 In the easy auctions all of the relevant packages are named packages as well as being the most profitable 
packages.
25 For the 6-item case average efficiency for the very hard auctions was 90.6 percent in the simulations with only 
1 of 6 auctions having average efficiency over 93 percent whereas efficiency averaged 95.1 percent for the medium-
hard auctions with only one of 6 having efficiency lower than 93 percent. In the 4-item case efficiency averaged 87.5 
percent for the very hard auctions versus 93.6 percent for the medium-hard case, with 2 (out of 6) of the very hard 
auctions having higher efficiency than the two medium-hard auctions. 
26 This difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level using a one-tailed Mann-Whitney test for the 
CCA6 auctions. But not significant at conventional levels for the CCA4 case.
27 One-tailed binomial tests in both cases.
VoL. 2 No. 3 179KAgEL ET AL.: PACKAgE BIDDINg
Efficiency in the CCA auctions is not uniformly higher than in the SAA auctions. 
In the easy category, the CCA auctions yield significantly higher efficiency than the 
corresponding SAA auctions ( p < 0.01), averaging a little over 10 percent higher 
efficiency, and the easy CCA auctions achieve 100 percent efficiency substantially 
more often than in the corresponding SAA auctions ( p < 0.01). But in the hard 
category, average efficiency in the CCA auctions is not significantly different from 
the SAA auctions ( p > 0.20). For very-hard cases, the CCA had lower average effi-
ciency, and substantially lower frequencies of 100 percent efficiency, than the cor-
responding SAA auctions for both the 4- and 6-item auctions ( p < 0.05 in all cases).
These findings provide evidence that the relative efficiency of the CCA and SAA 
auction mechanisms depend on the parameter configurations. Further, the similarity 
in outcomes between the easy and medium-hard CCA auctions serve to contradict 
any hypothesis that behavior in our experiment is entirely guided by price and prof-
its (as it is in our simulation). Rather, the data indicate that there is little difference 
in outcome efficiency between the easy and medium-hard cases, suggesting that 
named package play an important role in guiding bidding. Very hard auctions pro-
vide further evidence consistent with this explanation, as bidding on the single most 
profitable package or the named package does not consistently point bidders to the 
efficient outcome in these cases. This is a reminder, if any is needed, about the limits 
of simulators and the importance of identifying general properties of actual bidder 
behavior when attempting to predict auction outcomes.
C. Seller Revenue
For a competitive-revenue standard for package auctions, we follow Milgrom 
(2007) in using the minimum seller revenue at any core allocation. The core for 
Table 6—Outcomes in Medium Hard versus Very Hard Package Auction Outcomes
CCA Efficiency SAA Efficiency
Averageb
Percent of 
auctions 
achieving 100% 
efficiency Averageb
Percent of 
auctions 
achieving 100% 
efficiency
4-item auctions
Easy (9)a 95.7%(2.0)
88.9 82.2%
(3.1)
50.0
Medium hard (2)a  96.4%(2.2)
75.0 92.6%
(2.1)
25.0
Very hard (6)a 89.9%(1.9)
22.2 93.0%
(2.0)
58.3
6-item auctions
Easy (7)a 95.3%(1.8)
82.1 83.9%
(2.0)
28.3
Medium hard (6)a  94.2%(1.6)
59.4 87.8%
(1.3)
15.8
Very hard (6)a 90.7%(1.7)
21.2 93.8%
(1.5)
48.7
a Number of value profiles. 
b Standard error of the mean in parentheses.
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package allocation problems has a competitive auction interpretation: an individu-
ally rational allocation is in the core if there is no group of bidders who could all 
do better for themselves and for the seller by raising some of their losing bids. To 
enhance comparability, we report revenue in each auction as a percentage of the 
minimum revenue in the core. The experimental outcomes are reported in Table 7.
Our main hypotheses do not concern levels of revenues and profits. Compared 
to efficiencies, which are about allocations, revenue and profits may depend more 
sensitively on bidder behavior and the naïve bidding behavior used in the simulation 
may not be sufficiently descriptive to predict these outcomes. Also, the parameter 
selection procedure was based on outcome efficiencies, which is not the most suit-
able choice when evaluating how environments affect revenues and profits. We nev-
ertheless report outcomes based on the hard and easy cases.
We find no evidence that the revenues in the CCA differ significantly between the 
hard and easy categories ( p > 0.50). 28 Thus, the factors that lead to high efficiencies 
may differ from those that lead to high revenues in CCA. Comparing CCA with SAA, 
the only significant difference identified is that revenue in the SAA4 hard auctions is 
significantly higher ( p < 0.01) than in the CCA4 hard auctions. Note that in this one 
case, average revenue in the SAA auctions is over 100 percent of minimum revenue 
in the core. We will return to this point in the next section where profits are discussed.
There are no directly equivalent revenue results from other multi-unit auction 
experiments. Porter et al. (2003) do not report revenue comparisons between auction 
mechanisms. Brunner et al.’s (2007) normalization reports revenue as a percentage of 
the efficient allocation.29 They find that revenue is significantly higher in their version 
of the CCA auction than the simultaneous multi-round (SMR) auction employed by 
28 Statistical tests for Table 7 are all two-tailed, Mann-Whitney tests using each auction as the unit of observation.
29 Brunner et al. (2007) use actual revenue less the revenue from a random allocation, in which bidders pay full 
value, in the numerator, and revenue from the efficient allocation less the revenue from a random allocation in the 
denominator, so that the difference lies in taking differences from average revenue resulting from a random alloca-
tion in both the numerator and denominator. 
Table 7 —Revenue and Profits in CCA and SAA Auctions 
(Standard error of the mean in parentheses)
Revenueb Profitc Global profitc Local profitc
CCA SAA CCA SAA CCA SAA CCA SAA
4–item auctions
Easya (9) 92.1%(2.0)
98.6%
(2.4)
21.4%
(1.2)
8.8%
(2.7)
5.1%
(1.2) −3.4%(1.5)
8.2%
(0.8)
6.1%
(0.9)
Harda (8) 92.9%(2.4)
102.2%
(2.7)
20.1%
(1.8)
12.4%
(2.7)
3.4%
(0.9) −2.6%(1.4)
8.4%
(0.9)
7.5%
(1.0)
6–item auctions
Easya (7) 90.4%(3.1)
94.2%
(3.0)
18.5%
(2.4)
8.7%
(2.6)
4.6%
(2.1) −0.8%(1.4)
6.9%
(1.0)
4.7%
(1.0)
Harda (12) 92.9%(1.4)
86.7%
(2.5)
11.9%
(1.2)
16.2%
(2.3)
 4.2%
(1.0)
 4.5%
(1.1)
3.8%
(0.5)
5.9%
(0.9)
a Easy versus Hard categories defined as in Table 5 above. Number of value profiles in parentheses.
b Measured as a percentage of minimum revenue in the core.
c Measures as a percentage of the efficient allocation.
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the FCC (the closest relative to our SAA auction). This contrasts with our results as 
revenues are not significantly different in the six-item case and are significantly higher 
in the SAA in the four-item hard case. Their auctions involve bidding over more items 
than ours and include two global bidders competing over the same set of licenses. 
Also, because their mechanism withholds information about provisionally winning 
bids, it may encourage more bidding. Their revenue results hold for both high- and 
low-synergy cases. However, this comparison is strained by the fact that they had a 
relatively large number of items left unsold in their SMR auctions.
D. Bidder Profits
Table 7 reports profits as a percentage of the efficient allocation. As between hard 
and easy CCA auctions, total profit is significantly higher in the easy CCA6 auctions 
( p < 0.01), with most of the difference being accounted for by the higher profits for 
regional bidders in the easy auctions ( p < 0.01). Comparing between CCA and SAA 
auctions, total profits are markedly higher in the CCA auctions for the easy and hard 
4-item auctions as well as the easy 6-item auctions ( p < 0.05 in all cases). For the 
remaining hard 6-item case there are no significant differences between CCA and 
SAA auctions, with total profits somewhat higher in the SSA auctions for the hard case 
(but p > 0.10). Note that in each of the three cases where the CCA auctions generate 
higher profits, global bidders earn negative average profits in the SAA auctions, while 
the regional bidders earn positive average profits. These negative profits are reflective 
of the exposure problem which is eliminated in the CCA auctions and which is more 
severe for global as opposed to regional bidders within the SAA auctions. Further, it is 
these losses that contribute to revenue exceeding 100 percent of minimum revenue in 
the core for hard auctions in the SAA4 auctions mentioned earlier.
Our profit results stand in marked contrast to those reported in Brunner et al. (2007), 
where total bidder profits are lower, sometimes substantially lower, in the CCA com-
pared to the SMR auctions. Differently from Brunner et al. (2007), we announced 
provisional winners following each round of bidding. Failure to reveal provisional 
winners may cause bidders to raise their own winning bids at least some of the time. 
In our design bidders who do not raise their own provisionally winning bids could still 
“bid against themselves” by placing a bid that overlaps with their provisionally win-
ning bid. However, this is unlikely to occur in later auction rounds when final prices 
are set.
E. Distance from the Core
Table 8 reports distances from the core for both experimental outcomes and simu-
lated auction outcomes, using a revised definition of easy versus hard. Our original 
definitions of easy versus hard were based on evaluating the efficiency of simulation 
outcomes, and easy cases for efficiency may not also be ones in which the simulated 
behavior lies close to the core. Nevertheless, to the extent that the simulator reflects 
actual behavior, it may also be helpful in making predictions about the distance of 
outcomes from the core. We use the simulator to create another classification based 
in part on distance from the core.
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Auctions are categorized as core-easy if, in the simulations, they achieve 100 per-
cent efficiency and the scaled distance from the core is no greater than 15 percent.30 
All other auctions, whether they achieve 100 percent efficiency or not, are classified 
as core-hard. Raw distance from the core is defined as the maximum violation of one 
of the inequalities defining the core. The scaled distance is the raw distance divided 
by the difference between full efficiency and efficiency resulting from randomly 
allocating items among bidders.
For the simulated outcomes, the average scaled distance from the core is 5 percent 
or less for the core-easy CCA auctions versus 24 percent or more for the core-hard 
ones, with corresponding differences in the fraction of simulated outcomes achiev-
ing zero distance from the core. The experimental outcomes do not achieve the same 
magnitude of difference between core-easy and core-hard as the simulations, but the 
differences are in the right direction for both the four- and six-item cases. This dif-
ference is statistically significant at the one percent level in the CCA4 auctions. The 
difference between core-easy and core-hard is not as large in the CCA6 auctions, 
with average distance from the core significant at the 10 percent level, and percent 
of auctions with 0 distance from the core significant at the 5 percent level.
Although our categorization of core-easy versus core-hard in terms of the simula-
tions qualitatively predicts the experimental outcomes, it does not predict the levels 
accurately. Incorporating more details of bidder behavior into the simulation could 
narrow the discrepancy. But fine-tuning the bidder behavior model is not the main 
purpose of this paper.
30 Results are robust to alternative definitions, such as the simulated distances from the core being no greater 
than 10 percent. None of the auctions achieving 100 percent efficiency also achieve 0 distance from the core. 
Employing a criterion of simulated distance from the core being no greater than 5 percent yields 2 CCA4 core-easy 
auctions and 1 CCA6 core-easy auction, too small a sample for meaningful results. 
Table 8—Simulated Outcomes versus Experimental Outcomes: Distance from the Core
Auction outcomesb Simulation outcomesc
Average
distance
Percent of 
auctions 
achieving zero 
distance
Average
distance
Percent of 
auctions 
achieving zero 
distance
4-item auctions Core-easy
(8)a
14.0%
(3.3)
18.8 4.6%
(5.0)
44.3
Core-hard
(9)a
21.9%
(2.4)
3.7 29.7%
(20.4)
5.3
6-item auctions Core-easy
(5)a
18.6%
(4.9)
10.7 5.0%
(5.1)
39.7
Core-hard
(14)a
20.5%
(2.2)
2.6 24.9%
(14.9)
1.8
a Number of value profiles.
b Standard error of the mean in parentheses.
c Standard error in parentheses.
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F. Rounds to Auction Completion
The average number of rounds to completion was quite similar across auction 
mechanisms. For the auctions in the easy category, CCA6 (CCA4) auctions required 
an average of 15.5 (16.7) rounds per auction versus 18.5 (15.4) rounds for the SAA6 
(SAA4) auctions. For the hard category, CCA6 (CCA4) auctions required an average 
of 17.5 (17.8) rounds per auction versus 18.0 (15.2) rounds for the SAA6 (SAA4) 
auctions. None of these differences is statistically significant at conventional levels.
The one thing that does stand out in the data is that, not surprisingly, total bidder 
profits decrease systematically as the number of rounds in a given auction increase, 
regardless of which auction mechanism is used. For example, average profits of pro-
visionally winning bidders decreased monotonically over rounds 1–5, 6 –10, 11–15, 
15–20 and 20 or greater in the CCA6 auctions, going from a high of 208.4 ECUs in 
rounds 1–5 to a low of 17.6 ECUs in rounds greater than 20 for global bidders, and 
from a high of 113.6 ECUs to a low of 22.9 ECUs for regional bidders.
IV. Conclusion
We employ theory and experiment to investigate when “standard” package auc-
tions—and particularly the combinatorial clock auction (CCA)—lead to efficient 
or, more strongly, core outcomes in package allocation problems. Our analysis 
begins with two theorems asserting that if winning bidders bid most aggressively 
on their efficiency-relevant or core-relevant packages, and if losing bidders exhaust 
their profit opportunities, then the result is an efficient or core outcome, respec-
tively. Our experiment uses the CCA and a matched simultaneous ascending auc-
tion (SAA).
In principle, differences in performance among auction environments could depend 
on how many packages subjects bid on in different situations, so we begin by look-
ing for that. We find no evidence that these numbers vary between the easy and hard 
auction environments. Instead, bidders in our experiment typically bid on just the one 
or two most profitable packages and those packages often remained unchanged for 
many rounds during an auction. In our data, consistent with our theory, the CCA yields 
efficient allocations and core-level revenues most frequently when the packages that 
are selected by this sort of behavior are the relevant ones. We verify this by comparing 
the outcomes of our experiment to those of simple simulations, in which automated 
bidders bid only for the single most profitable package at each round.
The outcomes from our experiment are largely consistent with the two hypotheses 
we formulated in Section I: Subjects bid for many fewer packages than the profitable 
ones at the current round prices, and simulations based on such bidder behavior quali-
tatively help predict the efficiency of outcomes. Simulations were less effective, how-
ever, at predicting the distance of experimental outcomes from the core.
Our finding, that price-guided auctions can fail to direct bidders to relevant pack-
ages early enough in the auction, suggests possible improvements to the auction 
design. This failure could be greater in environments in which, unlike most of our 
auctions, bidders may have many core-relevant packages. One possible refinement 
is to make relevant bids more likely by making it easier to bid on more sets of 
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licenses. That might be accomplished by implementing a richer bidding language 
than the XOR language of our experiment.
A second element in our CCA design inhibiting bidding on the relevant packages 
is the reporting of provisionally winning bids. This impacts outcomes in two ways: 
by reporting provisionally winning bids may help bidders to tacitly collude, stop-
ping bidding early on if all bidders are satisfied with their current profits, and report-
ing provisionally winning bids encourages bidders to adopt a wait-and-see policy, 
hoping that a provisionally winning bid with a large profit margin will eventually 
become a winner—particularly in the later rounds of the auction. There was at least 
one clear case of tacit collusion with bidding ending in round 3, with prices at their 
starting values and substantial profits for all bidders.31 One way to control for such 
implicit collusion is to employ a tie-breaking rule which allocates packages to the 
smallest possible number of bidders, instead of randomly as in our experimental 
design. This would maximize the number of bidders without provisionally winning 
bids in early rounds thereby promoting defection from such tacit collusion. The 
provisionally winning bidders’ wait-and-see policy can generate inefficient assign-
ments and/or noncore (low revenue) outcomes. This happens because such bidders 
may fail to bid on alternative packages with greater potential profits and may miss 
opportunities to place higher bids on the same package. Withholding information 
about provisionally winning bids would eliminate the wait-and-see motive, but 
would add other difficult strategic choices.
As emphasized in the introduction, the set of package auction environments is 
far too large to be convincingly explored with experiments alone. The simulation 
approach provides a predictive theory that offers the promise of generalizable con-
clusions. In our experiment, simulations, which make specific predictions about 
efficiency, revenue, and the core, had some predictive success. We believe that simu-
lations are a promising tool for testing and designing practical auction mechanisms.
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